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Abstract
Many women identify sterilisation as their preferred form of contraception. How-
ever, their requests to be sterilised are frequently denied by doctors. Given a com-
mitment to ensuring women’s reproductive autonomy, can these denials be justified? 
To answer this question, I assess the most commonly reported reasons for a denied 
sterilisation request: that the woman is too young, that she is child-free, that she 
will later regret her decision, and that it will lower her well-being. I argue that these 
worries are misplaced and hence insufficient reasons for denying a request. I also 
argue that even if concern for patient welfare provides doctors with a valid reason 
to withhold sterilisation, this is overriden by respect for patient autonomy and the 
importance of enabling women’s reproductive control. Consequently, I suggest that 
adequately informed, decision-competent women should have their requests for ster-
ilisation agreed to, even if they are young and/or child-free. In addition, I examine 
the impact of pronatalism on how women’s requests are understood and responded 
to by doctors. I show that the equation of women with motherhood can make it 
unjustifiably hard for them to access sterilisation, especially if they are child-free. 
Consequently, part of ensuring women’s access to sterilisation involves challenging 
pronatalist beliefs and practices.
Keywords Autonomy · Contraception · Medical ethics · Pronatalism · Regret · 
Reproductive control · Sterilisation
Introduction
In 2015, Holly Brockwell wrote an article in the Guardian newspaper about her 
struggle to be sterilised (Brockwell 2015). She was first denied sterilisation at the 
age of 26 and had three subsequent requests denied in the following three  years, 
despite sterilisation being freely available on the UK’s National Health Service. 
Brockwell maintained that her request was based upon a strong, stable conviction 
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that she never wanted to have children. However, her doctors told her that she was 
too young and that she would later regret her decision. Brockwell’s case is not 
unusual. Women have long complained about being unable to access sterilisation 
(Campbell 1999; Borrero et al. 2008; Kluchin 2009, pp. 123–124). Indeed, Richie 
(2013, p. 38) reports that such accounts are ‘ubiquitous’. Given the importance of 
ensuring women’s reproductive freedom—which includes control over if, and when, 
to have children, as well as adequate access to effective contraception—it is impor-
tant to examine whether doctors can be justified in withholding access to sterilisa-
tion. To do so, I assess the most commonly reported reasons for a denied sterilisa-
tion request: that the woman is too young, that she is child-free, that she will later 
regret her decision, and that it will lower her well-being. I show that these worries 
are misplaced and do not justify withholding access to sterilisation. I also argue that 
even if concern for patient welfare does give doctors a valid reason to deny a sterili-
sation request, this can be overridden by respect for patient autonomy. Consequently, 
I conclude that decision-competent, adequately informed women should have their 
requests for sterilisation agreed to.
In addition, I examine and defend the reasons women have for requesting steri-
lisation in the first place. The choice of what form of contraception to use is a sig-
nificant and often difficult one to make. Thus, it is important to consider why some 
women prefer sterilisation to alternative methods. This will help individuals who 
are deliberating about what form of contraception could be best for them and allevi-
ate clinicians’ concerns about sterilisation. Finally, I examine how attitudes towards, 
and requests for, sterilisation are affected by women’s identity. This is an important 
issue to address because doctors currently control access to sterilisation and thus it 
matters greatly how they decide whom sterilisation is appropriate and inappropriate 
for. Of especial relevance is the pervasiveness of pronatalism, which equates women 
with motherhood and asserts that parenting is essential to their happiness and fulfill-
ment. This can make it excessively difficult for women to be sterilised, particularly 
if they are child-free. Thus, in addition to defending women’s access to sterilisation, 
I highlight some important dynamics that impact upon women’s reproductive auton-
omy within the practical, non-ideal context of medical decision-making.
What is Sterilisation?
Sterilisation is a form of permanent contraception. There are several different 
forms of female sterilisation: tubal occlusion, in which the Fallopian tubes are 
closed with clips or rings; hysteroscopic sterilisation, in which implants are used 
to block the Fallopian tubes; and salpingectomy, in which the Fallopian tubes are 
removed. Sterilisation is very effective: on average, one woman in 200 who is ster-
ilised will become pregnant during her lifetime. Although it is typically classified 
as irreversible, it is possible to reverse certain forms of sterilisation. The success 
rate (i.e. pregnancies carried to term) varies depending upon the method of steri-
lisation, ranging from 20 to 70% (Zite and Borrero 2011, p. 338). Given that the 
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probability of success is often below 40%, it is generally treated as if it is irrevers-
ible and those requesting it are advised to consider it as such (National Health 
Service 2015).1
Deciding to Request Sterilisation
Most women request sterilisation because (a) they do not want to have any (more) 
children; and/or (b) their health will be at risk if they become pregnant. There are 
many reasons why a woman may not want to have any (more) children, including: 
satisfaction with her current family size; the economic costs of having a/another 
child; the impact of parenting on her career; the environmental impact of raising 
children; the belief they are too old to have a/another child; greater opportunity for 
self-fulfilment; marital contentment; uninterest in parenthood (Veevers 1980; Mor-
rell 1994; Campbell 1999; Gillespie 2003; Park 2005; Kelly 2009). However, even 
if one does not want to have any (more) children, why choose sterilisation over other 
forms of contraception? What might be appealing/preferable about it?
Sterilisation is a quick, relatively simple procedure that is not dangerous to 
most women’s health, is 99% effective at preventing pregnancy and has very few 
negative side effects. Unlike the pill, sterilisation does not interfere with women’s 
hormone levels or cause weight gain, alterations in mood, breast tenderness, or 
decreased libido. Long-term use of the pill has also been linked with depression 
and an increased risk of serious health conditions, such as thrombosis and breast 
cancer. Furthermore, sterilisation allows for more spontaneous and, for some, more 
intimate and physically pleasurable sex than condoms (Higgins and Hirsch 2008). 
These points can explain why some women prefer sterilisation over condoms and 
the pill (Campbell 1999). However, there are also several disadvantages of sterilisa-
tion (National Health Service 2015). In the very unlikely event that it fails and the 
woman becomes pregnant, then there is an increased risk that it will be an ectopic 
pregnancy. With tubal occlusion, there is a very small risk of complications such as 
internal bleeding or damage to other organs. As a surgical procedure, sterilisation 
is more invasive than other forms of contraception and carries the risk of infection. 
Finally, it does not protect a person from STIs. Some women may be put off by these 
drawbacks, whilst others are untroubled by them, especially in comparison to con-
doms and the pill.
Sterilisation is also permanent and difficult to reverse. For women who think they 
might want to have a/another child, this is clearly a strong reason against it. How-
ever, for other women, it is the main attraction of sterilisation. Consider someone 
whose life will be at severe risk were she to become pregnant or who would pass 
on a fatal, painful genetic disease to her offspring. She should not become pregnant 
and hence the effectiveness and permanence of sterilisation provide her with good 
reason to choose it. The same reasoning applies, for example, to a woman in her 
late 40s who has four children and is certain she does not want any more. However, 
1 In the UK, the National Health Service states that it rarely offers reversal procedures, which means that 
one will have to obtain the operation privately and hence at significant financial cost.
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younger women with fewer or no children also request sterilisation. Given the pos-
sibility that they may change their minds and later want to have (more) children, it 
could be argued that they should not opt for a form of contraception that is perma-
nent and hard to reverse when non-permanent and easily reversed options are avail-
able. Specifically, long-lasting IUDs seem to offer the benefits of sterilisation with-
out the potential costs that arise if one later changes one’s mind about having (more) 
children. Should younger women with no children, or one or two children, necessar-
ily choose IUDs instead?2
Consider a woman in her late 20s who has a strong, persistent desire for a child-
free life. She sees her friends becoming parents and feels ever more certain that 
motherhood is not for her. She accepts that it is possible she might change her mind 
and want to have children of her own. However, based on her feelings, values and 
experiences to date, she does not think this will happen. Furthermore, she is famil-
iar with research findings—which I outline below—that indicate low levels of post-
sterilisation regret and similar levels of well-being between parents and voluntarily 
child-free individuals. Finally, she accepts the risk that she may later regret her deci-
sion but believes that she will be able to cope well with such a scenario. She might 
seek to adopt or become a foster parent, or else focus on enjoying the benefits of 
being child-free (perhaps she has a tendency to make the best of her current situa-
tion, rather than dwelling on what might have been). Certain that she wants to live 
a child-free life, and confident she will not change her mind about this, she decides 
that sterilisation is the best method of contraception for her.
This woman does not seem irrational or imprudent in preferring sterilisation 
over an IUD. The permanency of sterilisation may be a sufficient reason for some, 
perhaps most, women to choose an IUD instead. It also gives all women reason to 
deliberate carefully and extensively about whether it is right for them. Finally, it 
means that women who are unsure whether they will want (more) children have a 
good reason not to request it. However, it does not mean that all women should nec-
essarily prefer other forms of contraception over sterilisation and are unreasonable 
if they do not do so. People often make decisions that have permanent, irrevers-
ible consequences and which they may later regret (e.g. getting a tattoo; marrying; 
undergoing plastic surgery; having children; donating a kidney). This does not mean 
they should—and are irrational if they do not—therefore choose the less permanent 
and/or more easily reversed option. Indeed, for determinedly child-free women, or 
women who are happy with their current family size, the permanence of sterilisation 
is the major reason why they request it (Campbell 1999; Borrero et al. 2008).
Sterilisation can provide these women with a sense of control, satisfaction, inde-
pendence, relief and/or finality, allowing them to commit fully to their preferred life-
style and freeing them from worries of pregnancy (Borrero et al. 2008). To quote 
one voluntarily sterilised woman, ‘Having had your tubes tied does allow you to 
2 Some women, such as Holly Brockwell, are unable to use IUDs owing to a copper allergy. In Brock-
well’s case, her doctors still refused to agree to her request for sterilisation, thus requiring that she use 
the pill, condoms, refrain from having reproductive sex or that her partner be sterilised instead (an option 
suggested by one of her doctors).
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kind of proceed with the rest of your life’ (Borrero et al. 2008, p. 315). Sterilised 
women may be better able to plan for the long-term future, knowing that they will 
not have to think about having (more) children.3 It is not always/necessarily prefer-
able or more rational to keep all our options open, especially if this prevents us from 
fully embracing any one of them. As Dworkin (1982) has argued, less choice can 
sometimes be better than more. Perhaps we will be able to focus better on the life 
we want to live if we foreclose certain alternatives. If a woman is confident that she 
does not want (more) children, but still harbours occasional, unwanted doubts about 
this, then choosing to be sterilised may offer a welcome resolution in which such 
doubts are quashed. Furthermore, a woman who is determined to live a child-free 
life, or to limit her family size, for environmental reasons—such as the environmen-
tal impact of raising children and/or concerns about overpopulation—could want a 
permanent, irreversible form of contraception to ensure she realises these core ethi-
cal/political values. Perhaps, owing to societal and familial pressure, she worries 
that she will later be tempted to have a/another child, despite believing and desiring 
strongly that she should not. Sterilisation frees her from such worries and binds her 
to what she sees as the right way to live. Consequently, there can be advantages to 
choosing a contraceptive method that is permanent and difficult to reverse, even for 
young and/or child-free women.
A final relevant consideration is whether a woman’s age should affect her choice 
of contraception. It might be argued that younger women, perhaps those under 30, 
should not request sterilisation because they lack the self-knowledge and life-expe-
rience necessary to be certain that they do not/will not want to have (more) chil-
dren. In response, it can be observed that these women, such as Holly Brockwell, are 
intelligent, self-reflective individuals who can give clear and persuasive arguments 
in defence of their preference for sterilisation. Their relative lack of life-experience 
does not mean that they are incapable of making significant life-choices based on 
strong and persistent desires and values; there is no reason to assume they are less 
able to act autonomously than older women. Women in their 20s often make the 
permanent, life-changing decision to have children and this choice is not seen to 
be problematic simply in virtue of their age. Typically, we do not say they should 
necessarily wait until they are older, in case they change their mind, and it would 
certainly be wrong to prevent them from having a child on this basis.4 Furthermore, 
it is not necessarily the case that one becomes a more capable decision-maker as one 
ages. As Benn and Lupton (2005, p. 1324) note, ‘it is possible to become more fool-
ish as life progresses, rather than wiser’. Thus, a young woman’s age does not mean 
she should necessarily opt against sterilisation. Some women, even those who are 
young and/or child-free, can have good reason to prefer sterilisation to other forms 
of contraception.
3 If she is single and wants to be in a long-term relationship, then it may help her to achieve this. This is 
because her partner will know that their relationship will not involve having children of their own (or, at 
least, is unlikely to, given the rates of successful reversal). They can commit to one another in the light of 
this knowledge.
4 Admittedly, women’s child-bearing choices are not all treated in the same way. Reactions to them are 
shaped by the woman’s race, socio-economic status, sexuality, etc. However, the substantive point is that 
the woman’s age is not a good reason to prevent her from having a child, providing she is a legal adult.
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Can Denied Sterilisation Requests be Justified?
As noted in the Introduction, many women report having their requests denied, 
despite clinicians generally being willing to provide alternative contraceptive 
methods. Given the foregoing defence of a woman’s preference for sterilisation, 
coupled with the importance of respecting their bodily and reproductive auton-
omy, can these denials be justified?5
Withholding sterilisation is appropriate if the patient is not a legal adult or if 
she is being coerced into requesting it. It can also be appropriate if the patient 
is not competent to make a decision about sterilisation. Defining and identifying 
competence is a complex issue (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, pp. 114ff.). Fol-
lowing Buchanan and Brock (1989, pp. 23–25), competence can be understood 
as comprising several capacities, which include understanding, communication, 
reasoning and deliberation, as well as a set of values/conception of the good. It 
is also best characterised as a ‘process’ rather than an ‘outcome’ (Buchanan and 
Brock 1989, p. 47ff.). Competence is primarily a matter of how a decision is 
made, rather than solely concerning the content/outcome of that decision. This 
means that when doctors assess a patient’s request for sterilisation, they should 
focus on whether she has exercised the requisite competence capacities in mak-
ing her decision; that she understands what sterilisation involves, including its 
advantages and disadvantages/risks; that she has reflected on whether sterili-
sation is consistent with her longer-term values and preferences, including the 
relative strength and stability of these values; and that she has discussed the 
treatment and alternative options with suitable clinicians.6
An important implication of this ‘process’ view is that doctors should not 
assess a patient’s competence to make a decision about sterilisation solely based 
on what they think about the (un)reasonableness of it. In particular, doctors 
should not conclude that the patient lacks competence if they think sterilisation 
is a bad/unreasonable choice to make. As Ganzini et  al. (2004, p. 264) argue, 
‘clinicians should not conclude that patients lack decision-making capacity just 
because they make a decision contrary to medical advice’. For example, the fact 
that a doctor thinks sterilisation is ‘too risky’, given its permanence and the pos-
sibility of regret, does not mean that the patient’s request for it indicates non-
competence (e.g. because, according to the doctor’s judgement, the patient is 
irrationally risk-averse). Consequently, clinicians ought not to deny a sterilisa-
tion request on the grounds of non-competence simply because they do not think 
a person should want to be sterilised. A similar logic applies to a patient who 
6 Competence is also decision-relative, meaning that the requirements for being competent to make a 
decision vary according to the nature of the decision in question. For example, level of self-reflection 
necessary to be competent to decide whether to use the pill is lower than that required for deciding to be 
sterilised, given the latter’s permanence.
5 Some people will argue that all contraception is morally unacceptable and hence should never be 
offered to women. I cannot engage directly with this position here and instead assume that there is noth-
ing inherently immoral in using birth control.
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requests euthanasia: a doctor may think this is the wrong choice for them to 
make, but they should not take this as conclusive evidence that the patient lacks 
decision-making competence.
Nevertheless, there are some clear-cut cases where the patient is not competent to 
request sterilisation and this is good grounds for doctors withholding it from them. 
The first concerns a patient who lacks an adequate understanding of the procedure. 
For example, she may believe that sterilisation is non-permanent or easily reversed. 
The second concerns a patient whose preferences or life-plans are clearly inconsist-
ent with the nature of the treatment. This would occur if a woman requested sterili-
sation but also expressed a desire to have children of her own in the future. Finally, 
a woman may not be able to deliberate and reason adequately about sterilisation. 
This can be because of a permanent psychological impairment or disability, such 
as a severe learning disability. Alternatively, a woman can be temporarily non-
competent, which might occur if she is suffering from severe post-natal depression. 
Her depression may mean she cannot adequately reflect and act on her core values 
and preferences, which would guide her choice were she not depressed. In all these 
cases, clinicians can be justified in withholding sterilisation.7
However, can there be good reasons to deny sterilisation requests from decision-
competent women who understand the nature and implications of sterilisation and 
have a strong, abiding preference not to have any (more) children? A possible prag-
matic reason is cost: if sterilisation is significantly more expensive than other forms 
of contraception, then doctors may need to withhold it when cheaper, alternative 
forms of contraception are available. This only applies in a public healthcare con-
text, where budgets are extremely stretched and treatment is provided at no, or a 
much-reduced, cost to the patient. It will not apply if the patient is privately funded. 
The cost of sterilisation varies depending on the procedure and the country, but is 
around $3000/£2000 (Trussell et al. 2009). Although more expensive than alterna-
tive contraceptive methods, this will not necessarily be the case over the course of a 
lifetime. Regular use of the pill or IUDs over many years is likely to be more expen-
sive, because sterilisation is a one-off treatment (Zite and Borrero 2011, p. 339). 
Admittedly, this depends on the age of the woman. If she has only a few years of 
fertility left, then a single IUD will be required. This would likely make sterilisa-
tion the more expensive option. However, for younger women who do not want any 
(more) children, sterilisation could well be a more cost-effective option.8
An ethical reason for witholding sterilisation can be derived from the Hippocratic 
tradition’s commitment ‘to do no harm’. Some doctors may feel uneasy about per-
forming surgery on a patient that damages/stops the functioning of a healthy body 
part, considering this an unnecessary or otherwise unwarranted harm. Several points 
can be made in response to this concern. First, it is not clear that voluntary sterilisa-
tion does constitute a harm to the patient. Preventing the body from reproducing 
7 At least temporarily: if the patient develops sufficient knowledge of the procedure or reasoning ability, 
then a denied request may no longer be warranted.
8 Sterilisation is also considerably cheaper than many treatments offered to patients, such as IVF, and its 
cost needs to be weighed against the emotional and financial impact of unwanted pregnancy.
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does not in itself present a risk to the patient’s physical health, provided that the 
procedure is performed by qualified physicians using safe, suitable equipment. As 
outlined above, there are risks attached to being sterilised. However, (a) these com-
plications are rare; and (b) there are risks to many surgical treatments, which are 
nevertheless offered to patients who decide whether or not to undergo them. In addi-
tion, the notion of ‘harm’ can be construed as the ‘thwarting, defeating, or setting 
back of some party’s interests’ (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, p. 153). If a woman 
desires strongly to be sterilised—and sees it as in accord with her life-plans, values, 
etc.—then it is hard to see how it constitutes a harm to her.9 This is especially true 
of women for whom unwanted pregnancy would be extremely distressing and hence 
psychologically harmful (given the dangers of pregnancy and its impact upon the 
body, it may also be considered physically harmful). Sterilisation can be seen to pre-
vent harm to these women.
Furthermore, even if voluntary sterilisation is considered to inflict a physical 
‘harm’ on a woman, in the sense of destroying a natural faculty/function of the body, 
many people believe that clinicians can and should perform such procedures. Most 
notably, defenders of voluntary euthanasia hold that it can be permissible for doc-
tors to actively bring about the death of a patient. The justification for this is that 
the doctors’ actions will be for the good of the patient, in the sense of enabling her 
autonomy and/or promoting her well-being. This may be taken to show that treat-
ment which a patient requests autonomously does not constitute a medical harm (or 
medically relevant harm) to her, even if it is physically damaging. It also indicates 
that healthcare ethics need not, and should not, be reduced to the avoidance of doing 
harm to the patient. It also includes the principles of beneficence and respect for 
autonomy.10 As Beauchamp and Childress (2013, p. 202) observe, ‘Attending to the 
welfare of patients—not merely avoiding harm—embodies medicine’s goal, ration-
ale and justification’. Importantly, promoting patient welfare need not be reduced 
to the restoration of ‘normal’ (e.g. pre-illness or pre-injury) functioning. Especially 
given technological advances in medicine, there are many ways in which patients’ 
welfare can be improved by doctors, beyond rectifying illness or injury. Benn and 
Lupton (2005, p. 1323) note that much surgery performed today is life-enhancing 
rather than life-preserving. Clinicians also regularly provide non-surgical interven-
tions aimed at enhancing a patient’s quality of life, such as administering IUDs and 
offering therapeutic services such as counselling. The same applies to the abortion 
of a pregnancy that does not pose a serious threat to the woman’s life. As I discuss 
9 Clearly, non-voluntary sterilisation does constitute a harm to the patient, both in thwarting her interest 
in having children (assuming she has one) and in violating her autonomy.
10 Whereas the principle of non-maleficence relates to a negative obligation not to harm the patient, the 
principle of beneficence incorporates the positive obligation to promote the patient’s welfare and auton-
omy. As I argue below, the importance of ensuring that women enjoy reproductive control, coupled with 
women’s dependence on doctors for access to IUDs and sterilisation, generates a positive obligation for 
doctors to provide these methods of contraception to decision-competent adult patients. A patient’s right 
to reproductive autonomy places not only a negative obligation on doctors to refrain from making her 
pregnant, but also a positive obligation to assist her in avoiding pregnancy. The most obvious and appro-
priate way this can be done is through the provision of effective contraception.
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below, many sterilised women report that it has had a very positive effect on their 
well-being (Campbell 1999; Borrero et al. 2008). This also challenges the idea that 
voluntary sterilisation constitutes a ‘harm’.
In response, it might be objected that healthcare should focus on satisfying medi-
cal needs and interests—perhaps those which are classified as vital or basic—and 
that sterilisation does not relate to such a need or interest. This will apply particu-
larly to public (i.e. state-funded) healthcare, where budgetary constraints mean that 
clinicians must be selective in which treatments to offer. However, it might also 
apply to private healthcare, if one thinks that it too should be restricted to medically 
necessary treatment. Setting aside the issue of specifying what ‘vital’ or ‘basic’ 
needs and interests are, and how to determine what is ‘medically necessary’ treat-
ment, it seems reasonable to hold that reproductive control is a sufficiently impor-
tant and medically relevant interest for it to be a part of healthcare. It is essential to 
women’s bodily autonomy, physical health and psychological well-being that they 
control if or when they become pregnant (not least, because of the negative conse-
quences of unwanted pregnancies). This is why many/most people do not object to 
state-funded institutions such as the UK’s National Health Service providing the pill 
or IUDs to patients free of charge. Even if healthcare is restricted to meeting basic, 
vital or clinical needs, then this should include the provision of the patients’ pre-
ferred form of contraception.
Perhaps, though, there is only a requirement for healthcare to offer some meth-
ods of contraception. If so, then a justification is needed as to why IUDs and the 
pill should be provided, but not sterililsation. I have already ruled out the cost of 
sterilisation as providing this justification. An alternative reason, which is frequently 
offered by doctors, is that sterilisation is permanent (Campbell 1999). This concern 
is not limited to clinicians: whilst defending women’s reproductive freedom, Jackson 
(2001, p. 19) suggests that ‘sterilisation’s defect is its permanence’. Thus, clinicians 
may feel justified in denying a sterilisation request when they can administer alter-
native non-permanent contraceptive methods. However, the permanency of sterilisa-
tion is not a convincing justification for doctors to deny a request for it. That a medi-
cal treatment is permanent (and irreversible) is not itself a reason to withhold it. To 
the contrary, doctors often perform such treatments or facilitate women with making 
choices that have permanent effects, such as providing IVF. Whilst its permanence 
can be a good reason for a woman to decide against sterilisation, it is not a strong 
reason for doctors to withhold it.
A second very common reason for denied sterilisation requests is that the woman 
is too young. This generally means ‘under 30’, but women in their early or mid-30s 
are also denied sterilisation on this basis (Campbell 1999; Richie 2013; Brockwell 
2015). In a survey of doctors, Lawrence et al. (2011, p. 108) found that 70% of par-
ticipants were ‘somewhat or very likely’ to discourage a 26-year-old mother-of-one 
from being sterilised after her second birth when her husband disagreed with this 
decision.11 A 34-year-old woman said, ‘I asked again and they were like you’re too 
young. She [the doctor] just said, if you want it, you got to go to another doctor. 
11 If the husband agreed with the decision, then the figure dropped to 42%.
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It was just point blank… They will not tie my tube’ (Borrero et al. 2008, p. 316). 
However, appealing to the patient’s age is not a persuasive reason for withholding 
sterilisation. A woman in her 20s or 30s is legally and socially recognised as an 
autonomous agent. She is assumed to be sufficiently self-reflective, rational and 
independent to be able to make significant life-choices and, importantly, free to do 
so. Doctors do not and should not refuse a patient’s request for treatment simply 
because she is in her 20s or 30s.
It seems that two more fundamental concerns lie beneath these worries, which 
ultimately result in denied requests. Both of them relate to sterilisation’s impact 
upon a woman’s future welfare. The first concern is that the woman will regret being 
sterilised (Campbell 1999; Richie 2013).12 Regret is a painful emotion; it can be a 
source of pain/suffering, as we think of what might have been and reproach our-
selves for choosing as we did. The difficulty of reversing sterilisation means women 
who experience post-sterilisation regret will likely be stuck with it. Such regret may 
have a significant negative impact upon their well-being. Clinicians could therefore 
feel justified in preventing women from making choices they will regret. The sec-
ond concern is that child-free women who are sterilised will be denied the valuable 
experiences of parenthood which, from gestation onwards, are typically assumed to 
make a significant contribution to a person’s well-being. This can be because the 
experiences themselves are experientially positive ones and/or because parenthood 
is intrinsically valuable and an objective component of the good life. A doctor may 
deny a sterilisation request from a child-free patient because she is foreclosing a key 
source of her future happiness and fulfillment.
Both concerns demonstrate clinicians’ interest in the welfare of their patients. 
This is certainly laudable. If sterilisation does reduce women’s well-being, then cli-
nicians have a principled reason to withhold it. However, for this to be the case, two 
things need to be established: (1) that sterilisation is sufficiently likely to result in 
regret and reduced well-being; (2) that concern for patient well-being can override a 
woman’s preference for sterilisation, i.e. the principle of beneficence must be shown 
to outweigh respect for patient autonomy. I will consider each point in turn.
Post‑Sterilisation Regret and Women’s Well‑Being
Based on the available data, and contrary to clinicians’ worries, post-sterilisation 
regret is unlikely. In their survey of the data, Curtis et al. (2006, p. 205) conclude 
that ‘most women who undergo sterilisation remain satisfied with their choice of 
a permanent method of contraception’. Zite and Borrero (2011) report that rates of 
regret range from 1 to 30%, depending on the research. A study of 3672 women 
sterilised between 1985 and 1987 found that 7% experienced an occurrence of regret 
(Jamieson 2002). In a recent study of 308 Slovenian women, four (1.3%) of them 
regretted being sterilised (Becner et  al. 2015). Most studies of post-sterilisation 
12 As one consultant said, ‘They [women] shouldn’t do something they will regret’ (quoted in Campbell 
1999, p. 122).
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regret do not include information on child-free women, perhaps because most of 
their requests are denied. One exception is Campbell’s (1999) research. Only one 
of the 23 child-free women interviewed reported post-sterilisation regret.13 It is true 
that studies find younger women are more likely to regret their decision. However, 
among those under 30 at time of sterilisation, at most 20% of them report regret 
14 years after the procedure (Hillis et al. 1999). If doctors are withholding sterili-
sation because they think that women are likely to regret their decision, then this 
belief is not supported by the evidence, even for young and/or child-free women. It 
should also be noted that women can regret not being sterilised, e.g. in the case of a 
subsequent unwanted pregnancy. Finally, women can regret aspects of motherhood 
or having children altogether (Donath 2015) Thus, withholding sterilisation is not 
guaranteed to prevent regret, whilst allowing access to it for adequately informed, 
decision-competent women is unlikely to result in regret.
Importantly, being child-free does not seem to result in lower well-being com-
pared with having children.14 McLanaham and Adams (1987) examined existing 
research and concluded that parenthood may have negative consequences for a per-
son’s well-being. Simon (2008, p. 41) reports that ‘parents in the United States expe-
rience depression and emotional distress more often than childless adult counter-
parts… parents of grown children have no better well-being than adults who never 
had children’. In a study of 72 females, Jeffries and Konnert (2002) found that those 
who had chosen to be child-free had higher overall levels of well-being and fewer 
regrets than mothers. There are, of course, many positive experiences associated 
with having children, but there seems no support for the claim that having children 
inevitably makes for a more satisfying, rewarding, enjoyable and/or fulfilling life 
than one without children. Some women have little or no interest in raising children, 
or else value greatly activities and projects that are very difficult to reconcile with 
parenthood. For such women, the claim that their life is devoid of a major source of 
fulfillment and happiness—that they would be much happier had they become par-
ents—can seem simply false and even insulting.15
Finally, women often experience sterilisation as significantly improving their 
well-being. One way it does this is by eliminating the fear of becoming pregnant. 
Campbell (1999, p. 158) reports that women who want to live a child-free life often 
14 The concept of ‘well-being’ (which I treat as interchangeable with ‘welfare’) can be difficult to dis-
cuss because there are different accounts of it. In terms of the impact that voluntary sterilisation has on 
a person’s well-being, researchers, and the participants in their studies, may be operating with different 
understandings of the term. I assume a subjective account of well-being, which is focused on a person’s 
sense of life-satisfaction (see Sumner 1996) but also includes pleasurable/painful experiences. There is 
not space here to defend this view, although I take it to be plausible.
15 This is especially the case if one opts for a preference account of well-being. An objective account 
could assert that the woman’s life would be better were she a parent, assuming that parenthood is an 
objective good. Although I cannot make the case here, I take a preference account to be the more plau-
sible of the two. Even if an objective account is right, it would still need to be shown that (biological) 
parenthood itself is an objective good, rather than loving, fulfilling relationships in general.
13 Many participants emphasised their lack of regret and their great relief at being sterilised: ‘I have 
never had any regrets’; ‘I remain delighted and totally committed to my decision’; ‘I have no regrets, in 
fact I feel totally relieved and liberated’ (Campbell 1999, p. 169).
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‘remain deeply, desperately worried about unwanted pregnancy’. For those who 
do become pregnant, they then face the potentially harrowing decision of whether 
to have an abortion. Consequently, voluntarily child-free women frequently report 
‘overwhelming relief’ after being sterilised (Campbell 1999, p. 141).16 One such 
woman said she felt ‘totally relieved and liberated. It has been a wonderful thing for 
me’ (Campbell 1999, p. 170). Furthermore, ‘the feeling of making a commitment 
to a lifestyle through a permanent procedure [i.e. sterilisation]… can be essential 
to self-identity, satisfaction, and peace of mind’ (Richie 2013, pp. 38–39). Camp-
bell (1999, p. 162) concludes that sterilisation ‘is the method which currently offers 
the highest degree of security and peace of mind to determinedly childfree women’. 
Consequently, if a woman is confident that she does not want to have any (more) 
children, then concern for patient well-being does not require that doctors with-
hold sterilisation from her. Indeed, it seems a strong reason for them to agree to her 
request.
Respecting Women’s Autonomy
It could be claimed that a reported regret rate of 20% among younger women is not 
negligible. Assuming this figure is accurate, it might be high enough to raise seri-
ous concerns about offering the procedure to women in their 20s, especially if IUDs 
can be utilised instead. Furthermore, it is possible that rates of regret for all women 
increase to a level that people think is troublingly high. If so, this could undermine 
the case for women’s access to sterilisation by providing a strong beneficence argu-
ment against it. In response, it is important to emphasise that the possibility of regret 
applies to many decisions we make, both within and outside of a healthcare context. 
Despite this, we often permit or even enable people to make these decisions (pro-
vided, perhaps, that they are aware they could regret their choice). The reason we 
do this is because we respect their autonomy. Respect for patient autonomy is a key 
principle within biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, pp. 101ff.). It 
may be unwarranted for a clinician to withhold sterilisation from a decision-compe-
tent patient because this undermines or fails to acknowledge her autonomy, which 
incorporates the ability to make choices that she may later regret. Thus, although 
discussing the data on post-sterilisation regret and highlighting its rarity is impor-
tant—not least for women who are considering whether to request sterilisation—this 
should not displace the greater importance of protecting and enabling autonomous 
choices, even those that may be regretted.
In order to make this argument, it must be established what it means for a doc-
tor to ‘respect’ a patient’s autonomy, especially when responding to a request for 
treatment. It is important to note that, as things stand, patients do not have the 
right to demand specific medical treatment: they are not entitled to it. Respect for 
patient autonomy does not mean that doctors must obey a patient’s wishes. Rather, 
16 One said that, ‘it has been so nice to come off the Pill and not have the fear of pregnancy hanging over 
me’ (Campbell 1999, pp. 169–170).
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it principally means that patients must give their informed consent to the treat-
ments they receive. Patients therefore only have the right to refuse medical treat-
ment. Nevertheless, clinicians do provide some treatments on request, at least when 
this is made by decision-competent patients. This generates the expectation that 
such a request will be agreed, so long as the treatment poses no significant risk to 
the patient’s health. Importantly, this applies to forms of contraception such as the 
pill and IUDs. Arguably, this reflects the generally accepted importance of wom-
en’s reproductive control, which can be central to their autonomy and well-being. 
As highlighted above, deciding whether and when to have children is a major part 
of shaping the life that one wants to lead, especially given the disruptive and nega-
tive psychological impact of unwanted pregnancy. It is vital that women are able to 
control their reproduction. Reflecting this, the UN’s Population Fund asserts that 
women have the right to contraception (UNFPA 2013).17 Healthcare should thus 
enable women’s reproductive control by providing their preferred form of contra-
ception. This means that there is—and, importantly, there ought to be—a legitimate 
expectation that doctors will agree to a decision-competent woman’s request for 
sterilisation, unless there are sufficiently strong countervailing reasons.18 I am sug-
gesting that there are no such reasons.19 Thus, with regard to contraception, respect 
for patient autonomy should mean that patients are able to access their preferred 
form of it.
This position can be strengthened by arguing that it is not the role of clinicians 
to shield women from making decisions that they may regret. Respecting someone 
as autonomous involves allowing them to make such choices, rather than protecting 
them from all the possible negative consequences of their actions. To quote Richie 
(2013, p. 39), ‘regret is the competent woman’s burden, not the doctor’s’. Similarly, 
Brockwell (2015) emphasised her willingness to take responsibility for her choice, 
which included a refusal to blame doctors if she did later regret being sterilised. We 
may rightly see it as part of a doctor’s ethical duty to make a woman aware of the 
possibility that she could later change her mind about not having (more) children 
17 It has been suggested that there might be a relevant distinction between the negative right not to be 
made pregnant and the positive right to be sterilised. I am not convinced that this is a useful distinction 
to draw (beyond the general concern about coherently distinguishing between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
rights). A negative right not to be made pregnant could be reduced to the right that no one impregnates 
you against your will. However, this seems too limited. People should also be able to engage in non-
reproductive sex, which is what effective contraception enables. Thus, the negative right not to be made 
pregnant should incorporate the right to engage in non-reproductive sex, or else people should also pos-
sess the positive right to effective contraception. Either way, clinicians have a positive obligation to pro-
vide birth control. The issue is whether sterilisation should be one of the forms of contraception that 
doctors are required to offer to patients. I am arguing that it is.
18 Such an expectation can partly explain the distress women express in having their requests denied. 
After having her request summarily dismissed by a consultant, one child-free woman wrote, ‘I couldn’t 
believe that I was being ignored in such a way, this was my LIFE he was dismissing… Afterwards, I 
found that I was shaking with anger and cried quite a lot in the toilets’ (Campbell 1999, p. 114).
19 One caveat to this is that clinicians can refuse to perform some requested procedures on conscien-
tious grounds, which has occurred with regard to both abortion and sterilisation. Assuming a conscience 
clause should be attached to sterilisation, the doctor in question would be required to refer the patient to 
clinicians who will perform the procedure.
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and regret being sterilised. However, it is unwarranted for doctors to withhold steri-
lisation from a decision-competent woman who accepts the risk of regret and still 
desires to undergo the treatment. Additionally, it can be problematic if doctors tell a 
patient that she will regret her decision when, following careful self-reflection, she 
is confident that she will not. This presumes an epistemic authority over the woman 
regarding her feelings and preferences.
It thus seems objectionably paternalistic for clinicians (a) to protect a patient from 
making a choice she might regret, especially when she is confident she will not do 
so or is untroubled by this possible outcome; and/or (b) suggest that they know what 
is best for the woman—e.g. that she leaves the option of having (more) children 
open or that having a child will be good for her—when she is certain that she wants 
to commit to a child-free life or to maintain her current family size. These issues 
are evident in the experiences of child-free women requesting sterilisation, who said 
they were often made to feel like infants by their doctors (Campbell 1999, p. 123). 
A 31-year-old woman said that her consultant ‘came out with the statement that I 
was only a kid and that I didn’t know what I was missing by not having children… 
she said I would soon be back to have the operation reversed’ (Campbell 1999, p. 
125–126). Another said, ‘When I finally saw a consultant he laughed at my request 
and told me to come back when I was married and had had kids’ (Campbell 1999, p. 
114). The clinicians’ behaviour represents a serious failure to respect their patient’s 
status as self-reflective, autonomous agents and the authority this grants them over 
their contraceptive choices. Part of respecting a patient’s autonomy involves respect-
ing their preferences and desires, even when they differ significantly from the doc-
tor’s own or from what the doctor thinks the patient’s preferences and desires should 
be. It also involves permitting decision-competent patients to make decisions that 
they may regret. Doctors ought not override a patient’s autonomy, or conclude that 
the patient is non-competent, just because they themselves would not make this 
choice or do not share the patient’s views about reproduction, motherhood and/or 
whether possible regret should be avoided.20
A final issue to consider is how to balance the principles of beneficence and 
respect for patient autonomy. Is one more important/weightier than the other? Sev-
eral points suggest that, with regard to voluntary sterilisation, doctors should place 
greater emphasis on patient autonomy when responding to a request. First, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what an individual’s future well-being will 
be like, including whether they will regret their decision. It is affected by a myriad 
of factors and determined by events that can neither be foreseen nor fully controlled. 
This makes it difficult to know now which decisions will best promote their well-
being in the long term.21 What can be known with relative certainty is whether the 
woman is competent to make a decision about her method of contraception. Thus, 
we can respect her autonomy even if we cannot know how she will feel many years 
20 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
21 At least with regard to some choices, such as what method of contraception to use, whether to have a 
child, what career to pursue, which person to marry, etc. One can be sufficiently certain that infecting a 
person with a fatal disease against their wishes will not be good for them.
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later about her decision and what its impact upon her well-being will be. Second, 
medical paternalism is generally frowned upon and refusing a patient’s request for 
sterilisation on the basis that the doctor knows what is best for her future well-being 
can seem to be objectionably paternalistic. Third, refused sterilisation requests can 
be experienced as distressing and/or disrespectful, which will impact negatively 
upon well-being. Thus, respecting patient autonomy will often help to serve the goal 
of promoting patient well-being. These observations also reinforce the claim that the 
defence of voluntary sterilisation should rest more on women’s autonomy and repro-
ductive control than on levels of post-sterilisation regret.
The Impact of Pronatalism on Women’s Sterilisation Requests
I have argued that some women have good reason to request sterilisation, even 
when they can utilise other forms of contraception, and that these requests should 
be agreed to by doctors when made by decision-competent adults. In addition to 
constructing this philosophical defence of voluntary sterilisation, it is important to 
consider contraceptive decision-making in everyday, non-ideal contexts. Here, a 
woman’s identity can shape her own contraceptive decision-making as well as how 
her choice is understood and responded to by doctors. My focus is primarily on how 
women’s identity is perceived by doctors. The reason for this is that doctors ulti-
mately decide whether to agree to a sterilisation request and hence control access to 
it.22 Thus, how doctors recognise women, and how this affects their recognition of 
women’s autonomy and epistemic authority, is of great importance.
One factor that appears to shape clinicians’ responses to a woman’s sterilisation 
request is her gender. It seems to be significantly easier for men to obtain sterilisa-
tion than women (Richie 2013).23 This could be because ‘men are less bound by 
cultural norms of parenthood and [assumed to be] more competent to make deci-
sions’ (Richie 2013, p. 40). Furthermore, implicit gender bias in healthcare appears 
to be well-documented (Hamberg 2008). For example, men are three times more 
likely than women to receive knee arthroplasty when clinically appropriate (Chap-
man et al. 2013, p. 1507). One explanation for this is that men are presumed to be 
more stoic and hence better able to cope with treatment (Chapman et al. 2013, p. 
1507). Given that doctors often worry about post-sterilisation regret, they could be 
more willing to sterilise men because they assume that they will cope better with 
any regrets that arise. Similarly, men may be assumed to know their own mind bet-
ter than women, and hence more capable of knowing for certain what their core 
22 I cannot address here whether this relationship should be altered or, indeed, eradicated. For example, 
condoms are ‘de-medicalised’ in the sense that access to them is not controlled by clinicians. One can 
imagine the development of a home sterilisation kit, which could be purchased from licensed shops by 
anyone over a certain age. This would remove the problem of women being denied access to sterilisation 
by doctors, although there could still be compelling arguments against it.
23 Although this observation must be accompanied by the caveats that (a) there is very little information 
available on male sterilisation requests and their acceptance rates; and (b) male vasectomy is more easily 
reversed than female sterilisation.
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preferences are and whether they might change their mind later. Finally, it is possi-
ble that men are more assertive and perceived to be more confident, which makes it 
easier for them to obtain their desired treatment, especially when their doctors have 
doubts about providing it.24
It is also important to consider VS in relation to the prominence of pronatalism 
within society. Pronatalism can be defined as ‘an attitudinal stance that favours and 
encourages childbearing… [and] supports policies and practices that construe and 
venerate motherhood as the sine qua non of womanhood’ (Gotlib 2016, p. 331).25 
It is thus founded upon, and reinforces, the equation of woman with motherhood 
(Morrell 1994; Gillespie 2003; Kelly 2009). Furthermore, it asserts that motherhood 
is a/the primary source of a woman’s happiness and fulfilment, a message that is 
oft-repeated in literature, film, advertising, medical practice and government policy 
(Gotlib 2016). This results in an entrenched assumption/expectation that women will 
and should want to reproduce. A further effect of pronatalism is that women who 
voluntarily forego motherhood are often portrayed as, and assumed to be deviant, 
incomplete, miserable, bitter, unfulfilled, unnatural and/or selfish (Campbell 1999; 
Gillespie 2000; Park 2002; Gotlib 2016). Being child-free is thus described as a stig-
matised identity (Veevers 1980; Park 2002). From a pronatalist perspective, women 
who seek sterilisation go against their perceived nature qua woman. Morrell (1994, 
p. 77) observes that many people assume that ‘only women who are morally sus-
pect or flawed by events beyond their control would reject motherhood’. Similarly, 
as Gillespie (2000, p. 225) argues, ‘Failure to become a mother is interpreted within 
a western biomedical framework as a physical or psychological illness’.
In light of this, doctors may treat child-free women’s sterilisation requests with 
suspicion or dismiss them altogether, as it is assumed that no rational and self-reflec-
tive woman would willingly forego having children of her own.26 The reason given 
for their denied requests is ‘often related to the medic’s fundamental belief that no 
mature woman could reach such a decision [to be sterilised] and that she will even-
tually grow out of her infant state, will reach maturity and will then wish to have 
children’ (Campbell 1999, p. 115). This suggests that child-free women face a cred-
ibility deficit in having to prove the validity and acceptability of their feelings and 
decision to be child-free and/or sterilised (Gillespie 2000; Park 2002; Gotlib 2016). 
24 The recognition of women’s autonomy and decision-making capacity will itself be affected by their 
particular identity, including their socio-economic status, ethnicity and race. For example, women who 
are poor and/or without educational qualifications may be viewed as less autonomous than other women.
25 It should be noted that not all women’s child-bearing is equally valued. For example, poor and/
or minority women may be discouraged from reproducing, and some countries have forcibly sterilised 
them (Kluchin 2009). This may make it easier for them to access sterilisation. However, black women are 
also associated strongly with motherhood in certain cultural representations of them (e.g. the African-
American ‘mamma’), which may make it more likely that their request is denied. Wealthy, white and/or 
educated women may find it harder to have their sterilisation request agreed to, because they are seen as 
ideal mothers. Overall, there is a confluence of factors that affect how women’s requests are responded 
to, which may push in different directions.
26 Following another denied request for sterilisation, one child-free women wrote that ‘Yet again a mem-
ber of the medical profession dismissed my concerns and beliefs without even listening to what I had to 
say’ (Campbell 1999, p. xxii).
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Women with one or two children also experience this difficulty, as it will be assumed 
that they will want to have more children in the future. Such scepticism also reveals 
a questionable asymmetry between how requests for medical assistance in reproduc-
tion, e.g. for IVF, are responded to and how sterilisation requests are responded to. 
Women who seek sterilisation are required to go through a much more extensive 
process of justification than women who want to become pregnant, even though both 
are significant, permanent life-choices. Indeed, choosing to have a child constitutes 
a major life-changing event, whereas deciding not to have a child involves maintain-
ing one’s life as it is. This could mean that requests for IVF should be treated as 
much more significant and hence subjected to greater scrutiny by clinicians.
The effects of pronatalism are also relevant to understanding post-sterilisation 
regret and clinicians’ worries about it. People, including doctors, may expect a child-
free woman to regret being sterilised and be suspicious of her if she does not. This 
expectation could foreclose doctors’ ability to imagine a child-free woman living a 
fulfilling life. It also reveals a failure to consider other ways that women can become 
mothers, including adoption and marrying into a family, or the assumption that these 
are less fulfilling and/or valuable routes to motherhood. Furthermore, it is possi-
ble that some sterilised women’s regret is induced or deepened by the clear, persis-
tent message that a woman’s happiness consists in having children. As a result of 
people’s responses to her decision, including the expectation that she will come to 
regret it, and the wider societal depiction of female identity in terms of motherhood, 
she herself may come to feel that she has made a poor decision and that her life 
would have been better if she had had children of her own. If being child-free were 
less stigmatised, and pronatalism less pervasive, then there might be fewer occur-
rences of post-sterilisation regret and less expectation and/or worry that it will arise.
It is important to note that doctors who are reluctant to agree to sterilisation 
requests may not endorse pronatalism. They may think that women will inevitably 
bow to pronatalist pressures, without thinking that this is a good thing. Thus, they 
may be acting in what they take to be women’s best interests, given their assumption 
about what her future preferences will be. Nevertheless, they would still be (a) mak-
ing the problematic assumption that women are likely to change their mind about 
not having any (more) children and hence to regret their decision; and (b) failing to 
respect women’s autonomy by overriding their expressed preferences and prevent-
ing them from making a decision they may regret. One way of alleviating concerns 
about, and occurrences of, post-sterilisation regret is to challenge pronatalist dis-
courses that portray a child-free life as necessarily less fulfilling than parenthood. 
An important part of this consists in promoting counter-narratives of happily child-
free women and/or sterilised women who are regret-free. This will help women 
deliberating about what form of contraception to use, as they may feel more confi-
dent/accepting of their own desire for a child-free life. It will also reassure doctors 
who are worried about the adverse effect of sterilisation on women’s future well-
being, hopefully making it more likely that they will agree to sterilisation requests 
from decision-competent women.
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Conclusion
Women’s bodily autonomy and the importance of reproductive freedom/control 
provide a strong argument in favour of women’s access to sterilisation. To bolster 
this claim, I have shown why some women can prefer sterilisation to other forms of 
contraception, even if they are young and/or child-free. Denied sterilisation requests 
thus require a good justification. I have argued that the main reasons offered by doc-
tors for withholding access to it—that the woman is too young, child-free and/or 
likely to regret her decision—are unconvincing at both an empirical and a norma-
tive level. Consequently, decision-competent women should have their sterilisation 
requests agreed to. I have also shown that pronatalism can shape how requests for 
sterilisation are responded to by doctors. The equation of women with motherhood, 
and the assumption that motherhood is central to a woman’s happiness and fulfill-
ment, can make it unustifiably hard for women to access sterilisation, especially if 
they are child-free. Pronatalism may also generate the unfounded concerns held by 
some doctors that women are likely to regret being sterilised and that it will lower 
their well-being. Contrary to these worries, a child-free life can be a happy and ful-
filling one, and decision-competent women rarely regret being sterilised. Further-
more, even if doctors do hold such worries, then respect for patient autonomy and 
the importance of women enjoying reproductive control entail that their sterilisation 
requests should be agreed to.
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